Many years ago, back during my college days, an acquaintance who, like me,
was involved in leftist activism, explained that he was getting ready to
write his doctoral thesis on Walter Benjamin. I knew little about him, except that he was a
Marxist cultural critic from the period between the two big wars who had
belonged to the renowned Frankfurt School and never quite wrote any sistematic philosophical
work. To be fair, I knew a little bit more than that thanks to some articles
I read in the excellent magazine Debats, published by Alfons el Magnànim with some funding from the Valencian regional government.
Nevertheless, the point is that Benjamin was still greatly unknown among the
ranks of the Spanish activist left, and I would not bet that the situation
has changed at all in the intervening years. Who was then Walter Benjamin?
Born in Germany in 1892, Benjamin would later in life come up with an
interesting mixture of Jewish mysticism and historical materialism that he
applied to the literary and cultural worlds in his philosophical essays.
Essays, incidentally, that would never take a very systematic form. After
all, he published most of his writings in newspapers and magazines. So, many
of the pieces collected in these volumes usually have a few pages at the
most with some others (the notes that he took in his own notebooks, mainly)
usually comprising no more than two pages. This is, then, a philosopher
who left us fragments, pieces of a puzzle that are not easy to fit together
into a larger picture that perhaps he never had the intention to paint, quite
in the same style as Nietzsche. In that sense, it could be argued that Walter Benjamin
preceded and foresaw our contemporary postmodernism. It should therefore surprise no one that his
writings were rediscovered in the 1970s and 1980s, precisely at the same time
as cultural
studies were gaining grounds at our Western universities and the term
deconstruction was all the rage in intellectual circles (it should not surprise anyone
either that certain people
may accuse Benjamin of "nihilistic" and "incoherent", especially if the
accusations are coming from conservative circles which are prone to see in
this style all the signs of the "liberal evil").
Yet, it is difficult to blame Benjamin or other people of his generation
for this nihilism. These
are the people who were sent to the battlefields of First World War to be butchered for no
apparent reason, no higher ideal (this is, incidentally, a significant
difference between the Great War and the Second World War where idealism did play an important,
if not vital, role). When it all ended in 1918, there were no partisans to
tell us romantic stories, neither could anyone argue that the defeated Germans
incarnated pure evil as it would happen in 1945. To make matters worse, both
sides had committed the mistake of thinking about war in the same old
categories of the 19th century in spite of all the technological advances
that took place in between. The consequence was, of course, that millions
were simply butchered on the battlefield, human beings counting as little
more than numbers in the rooms of the military strategists. As Benjamin
himself explains:
... experience has fallen in value, amid a generation which from 1914 to
1918 had to experience some of the most monstrous events in the history of
the world. Perhaps this is less remarkable than it appears. Wasn't
it noticed at the time how many people returned from the front in silence?
And what poured out from the flood of war books ten years later was anything
but the experience that passes from mouth to ear. No, there was nothing
remarkable about that. For never has experienced been contradicted more
thoroughly: strategic experience has been contravened by positional warfare;
economic experience, by the inflation; physical experience, by hunger; moral
experiences, by the ruling powers. A generation that had gone to school
in horse-drawn streetcars now stood in the open air, amid a landscape in
which nothing was the same except the clouds and, at its center, in a force
field of destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human
body.
(Experience and Poverty, Volume 2, pp. 731-732)
In this context, it is not at all surprising that so many intellectuals
(actually, so many individuals of any condition) were so desperate for a
solution, a way out, once the war was over, falling in general terms in
one of the following three groups: those who thought that the only possible
solution was a return to a past that predated the technological, urban and
industrial changes that to some extent brought about the horrors of the
Marne
(i.e., the reactionary conservatives); those who wanted to gamble everything
on the Communist revolution with the hope that it would also put an end to
the bourgeois wars; and, finally, those who were convinced that both
bourgeois capitalism and Marxism were inherently corrupt and society needed
to be cleansed of all past sins through a purifying fire (i.e., the
Fascists). Benjamin
belonged to the second group, although his was a very heterodox form of
Marxism, to be sure, if
it is that we can consider him a Marxist at all. For, it seems to me, that
Benjamin was to some extent a victim of his time. So, of the three paths
succintly outlined above, he appeared to have chosen the one that led to
Communism more out of
disgust towards the other two than anything else. One is prone to think
that Benjamin saw it, perhaps, as the lesser evil, difficult as this may
be to understand from today's perspectives (but then, to be fair, the
Gulag had not even happened
yet). Again, it seems too easy to blame those who lived those years for
their "nihilism" and "immorality" when they had to face such stark choices.
Yes, it is precisely under those circumstances where great men prove
themselves, but it is simply not fair to expect that so many great men will
exist at one given time.
So, what is a Jew who still regards his own Judaic background as relevant, whose main interest lays in
books and cultural issues but who wants to contribute to the Socialist cause to do? As I explained,
Benjamin developed a very heterodox form of Marxism, one that, as in the
case of Antonio
Gramsci, paid more attention to the superstructure (i.e., the
world of cultural constructs) than the infrastructure (i.e., the
economic relations and direct class struggle). Yet, he could never avoid
the uncomfortable feeling that any attempt at inventing a revolutionary
art would always end in failure:
Since the end of the war the left-wing intellectuals, the revolutionary
artists, have set the tone for a major segment of the public. It has now
turned out, all too clearly, that this public esteem was not matched by any
profounder impact on society. From this we may conclude, in Berl's words,
that "an artist, however much he may have revolutionized the arts, is no
more revolutionary than Poiret, who in his day revolutionized the world of
fashion". The most advanced and daring products of the avant-garde in
all the arts have had only the haute bourgeoisie as their public —in
France and Germany alike. This fact does not necessarily imply a judgment
on their work, but it does point to the political uncertainty of the groups
that stood behind these manifestations.
(The Present Social Situation of the French Writer, Volume 2, p. 760)
He could not avoid either, like so many other intellectuals at the time,
the first and damaging evidence that perhaps the Soviet Union was becoming a more perfect form of
tyranny rather than the paradise of the proletariat:
Brecht calls Der Prozess a prophetic book. "You can see from the
Gestapo what could become
of the Cheka".
(Notes from Svendborg, Volume 2, p. 787)
... which is, precisely, why the leftist intellectuals cannot claim ignorance
when they are accused of supporting the Communist tyranny during so many
years. As I said above, it is way too easy for us to pontificate about what
they should or should have not done from our comfortable present day, but
it is nevertheless clear that they cannot claim ignorance. They supported
Stalinism and knew
perfectly what they were doing. Yes, they thought it was a lesser evil,
and were convinced that the
liberal democracies would necessarily be defeated either by
Communism or Fascism, therefore not being a realistic choice, but they knew it
was still an evil.
It is only keeping all this, the historical context, in our minds that we
can understand how the same Benjamin who calls himself a Communist and
writes about the upcoming revolution and the current state of the working
class, also resorts to his own Jewish background to analyze the culture of
his time:
In a Hasidic village, so the story goes, Jews were sitting together in a
shabby inn one Sabbath evening. They were all local people, with the
exception of one person no one knew, a very poor, ragged man who was
squatting in a dark corner at the back of the room. All sorts of things
were discussed, and then it was suggested that everyone should tell what
wish he would make if one were granted him. One man wanted money; another
wished for a son-in-law; a third dreamed of a new carpenter's bench; and
so each spoke in turn. After they had finished, only the beggar in his
dark corner was left. Reluctantly and hesitantly he answered the question.
"I wish I were a powerful king reigning over a big country. Then, some
night while I was asleep in my palace, an enemy would invade my country,
and by dawn his horsemen would penetrate to my castle and meet with no
resistance. Roused from my sleep, I wouldn't have time even to dress and
I would have to flee in my shirt. Rushing over hill and dale and through
forests day and night, I would finally arrive safely right here at the
bench in this corner. This is my wish". The others exchanged uncomprehending
glances. "And what good would this wish have done you?" someone asked.
"I'd have a shirt", was the answer.
(Franz Kafka, Volume 2, p. 812)
This is obviously not your usual Marxist. On the contrary, Benjamin
emphasizes the sphere of the cultural, the literary, the superstructure that
dogmatic Marxists always despised so much:
Since the transformation of the superstructure proceeds far more slowly
than that of the base, it has taken more than half a century for the change
in the conditions of production to be manifested in all areas of culture.
How this process has affected culture can only now be assessed, and these
assessments must meet certain prognostic requirements. They do not, however,
call for theses on the art of the proletariat after its seizure of power, and
still less for any on the art of the classless society. They call for
theses defining the tendencies of development of art under the present
conditions of production. The dialectic of these conditions of production
is evident in the superstructure, no less than in the economy. Theses
defining the developmental tendencies of art can therefore contribute to
the political struggle in ways that it would be a mistake to underestimate.
The neutralize a numbre of traditional concepts —such as creativity
and genius, eternal value and mystery— which, used in an uncontrolled
way (and controlling them is difficult today), allow factual material to be
manipulated in the interests of fascism.
(The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Volume 3, pp.
102-103)
It certainly sounds much closer to the New Left of the 1960s, grounded both on unorthodox forms of
Marxism and a good degree of Anarchism. One finds it difficult to believe that Benjamin's ideas could
be acceptable to those Stalinists who actually controlled the Party and the Komintern. His philosophy comes across as "too
bourgeois", too worried about about issues that your average working class
individual could not care any less about. In this sense, chances are he was
just viewed by the apparatchik as little more than an useful travel
fellow. He even goes as far as mending Marx and reinterpreting his main ideas for us:
Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But
perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the
passengers on this train —namely, the human race— to activate
the emergency brake.
Three basic concepts can be identified in Marx's work, and its entire
theoretical armature can be seen as an attempt to weld these three concepts
together. They are the class struggle of the proletariat, the course of
historical development (progress), and the classless society. The structure
of Marx's basic idea is as follows: Through a series of class struggles,
humanity attains to a classless society in the course of historical
development. = But classless society is not to be conceived as the endpoint
of historical development. = From this erroneous conception Marx's
epigones have derived (among other things) the notion of the "revolutionary
situation", which, as we know, has always refused to arrive. A genuinely
messianic face must be restored to the concept of classless society and,
to be sure, in the interest of furthering the revolutionary politics of
the proletariat itself.
(Paralipomena to "On the Concept of History", Volume 4, pp. 402-403)
Benjamin dares to call for "a messianic face" that is "to be restored" on
top of Marxist ideas, which must have amounted to something close to mortal
heressy among the dogmatic left of the time. He does not seem interested at
all in economic issues or the explotation of labor under the capitalist
system, but rather writes about pretty much everything else he can think of:
aesthetics and art in general, the avant-garde, films and the movie industry, the concept of semblance,
Franz Kafka, Baudelaire, Goethe, epic theater, newspapers, Marseilles,
Moscow, Naples, Ibiza, astrology, the trade of lizards from the Balearic
Islands, his own experiences with hashish... Benjamin was a writer who simply could not put down the
pen, an author with a kaleidoscopic approach to reality. Even in this
respect he managed to predict our blogging days, although thank
goodness his interests went way beyond the monothematic rants that tend to
characterize this contemporary medium. Nevertheless, he managed to predict
this development too:
For centuries it was in the nature of literature that a small number of
writers confronted many thousands of readers. This began to change toward
the end of the past century. With the growth and extension of the press,
which constantly made new political, religious, scientific, professional,
and local journals available to readers, an increasing number of readers
—in isolated cases, at first— turned into writers. It
began with the space set aside for "letters to the editor" in the daily
press, and has now reached a point where there is hardly a European engaged
in the work process who could not, in principle, find an opportunity to
publish somewhere or other an account of a work experience, a complaint,
a report, or something of the kind. Thus, the distinction between
author and public is about to lose its axiomatic character.
(The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Volume 3, p. 114)
Who cannot see the direct connection between this idea and
Andy Warhol's "five minutes of fame"
theory? We already live in the world described by Benjamin where the
distinction between author and public is pretty much non-existent. After
all, what do we think all those TV stations pretend to do out there when they
"take the microphones out to the streets"? Is it even possible to watch
a debate these days where the audiences' opinions are not aired no matter
how inane they may be? And should we even consider the constant presence
of the poll everywhere? The lines are definitely disappearing very fast.
Alongside plenty of comments and thoughts about a myriad of issues,
Benjamin also shares a few gems with us, reflections that can be taken as
a springboard to study a given topic and write more about it. In that
sense, Benjamin's writings are a constant source of inspiration, provided
that one knows how to separate the wheat from the chaff. Thus, he
reflects about the nature of the Greek classical myths apropos contemporary
reinterpreations such as Stravinsky's Oedipus Rex or Cocteau's Orphée, in what would come to be
referred to as Neoclassicism.
The Greek myths
are fundamentally rational, and for this very reason a man may say, without
its making him a bad Christian, that they are much easier to grasp than the
teachings of Paul. Now it is important not to misunderstand this.
Gide does not claim that
reason produced Greek myths, nor even that for the Greeks the meaning of myth
lays in its rationality. What is important, rather, is how the modern
meaning gains a distance from the old, and how that distance from the old
interpretation is just a new closeness to the myth itself, from which the
modern inexhaustibly offers itself up for renewed discovery.
(Oedipus, or Rational Myth, Volume 2, p. 578)
Of all the topics Benjamin discusses in these four volumes of writings, I
would select two where his thoughts are particularly inspiring. First of
all, he notices how the ages old tradition of storytelling is in clear decline in modern society (I
believe it is safe to affirm that this is even more true in our days). But
why? How can we explain this near extintion of an oral tradition that had
been with us since the early days of humanity itself? Benjamin may have
found the answer.
Why is storytelling on the decline? —This is a question I often
asked myself when I sat with other guests around a table for an entire evening
feeling bored. (...) I realized that people who are not bored cannot tell
stories. But there is no longer any place for boredom in our lives. The
activities that were covertly and inwardly bound up with it are dying out. A
second reason, then, for the decline in storytelling is that people have
ceased to weave and spin, tinker and scrape, while listening to stories. In
short, if stories are to thrive, there must be work, order, and subordination.
(The Handkerchief, Volume 2, p. 658)
As a matter of fact, in order to preserve storytellign we would also have
to cherish another old tradition that appears to be disappearing at a very
fast pace, that of conversation. In contemporary society, we have replaced many sorts of direct
inter-personal relationships with entertainment, which is much more controllable as a commodity.
It is quite simple: without dialogue, without human warmth, there is no
storytelling. The show
business finds it much easier to deal with atomized realities, with
defenseless individuals incapable of taking their own initiative who prefer,
therefore, to be entertained in a passive way. I am not sure Benjamin foresaw
the importance of entertainment in late capitalism, but he somehow managed to
notice its seeds. Some might try to argue that storytelling has simply been
replaced with journalism
but Benjamin also considered that:
Every morning brings us news from all over the world. Yet we are poor in
remarkable stories. Why is that? It is because no events reach us without
being permeated by explanations. In other words, hardly anything redounds
to the advantage of the story; nearly everything, to that of information. In
fact, half the art of storytelling is that of keeping it free of all
explanations during the telling.
(Little Tricks of the Trade, Volume 2, p. 729)
Furthermore, he also dismisses pre-emptively another possible counter-argument:
that today's storytelling tradition is simply continued by the
novel.
The earliest indication of a process whose end is the decline of storytelling
is the rise of the novel at the beginning of modern times. What
distinguishes the novel from the story (and from the epic in the narrower
sense) is its essential dependence on the book. The dissemination of the
novel became possible only with the invention of printing. What can be
handed on orally, the wealth of the epic, is different in kind from what
constitutes the stock in trade of the novel. What distinguishes the
novel from all other forms of prose literature —the fairy tale, the
legend, even the novella— is that it neither comes from oral tradition
nor enters into it. This distinguishes it from storytelling in particular.
The storyteller takes what he tells from experience —his own or
that reported by others. And he in turns makes it the experience of those
who are listening to his tale. The novelist has secluded himself. The
birthplace of the novel is the individual in his isolation, the individual
who can no longer speak of his concerns in exemplary fashion, who himself
lacks counsel and can give none.
(The Storyteller, Volume 3, p. 146)
The formula in which the dialectical structure of film —film considered
in its technological dimension— finds expression runs as follows.
Discontinuous images replace one another in a continuous sequence. A theory
of film would need to take account of both these facts. First of all, with
regard to continuity, it cannot be overlooked that the assembly line, which
plays such a fundamental role in the process of production, is in a sense
represented by the filmstrip in the process of consumption. Both came into
being at roughly the same time. The social significance of the one cannot be
fully understood without that of the other. At all events, our
understanding of this is in its infancy.
(The Dialectical Structure of Film, Volume 3, p. 94)
In principle, the work of art has always been reproducible. Objects
made by humans could always be copied by humans. Replicas were made by
pupils in practicing for their craft, by masters in disseminating their
works, and, finally, by third parties in pursuit of profit. But the
technological reproduction of artworks is something new. Having appeared
interminttently in history, at widely spaced intervals, it is now being
adopted with ever-increasing intensity. Graphic art was first made
technologically reproducible by the woodcut, long before written language
became reproducible by movable type.
(The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Volume 3, p. 102)
The here and now of the original underlies the concept of its authenticity,
and on the latter in turn is founded the idea of a tradition which has passed
the object down as the same, identical thing to present day. The
whole sphere of authenticity eludes the technological —and of course
not only technological— reproduction. But whereas the authentic
work retains its full authority in the face of a reproduction made by hand,
which it generally brands a forgery, this is not the case with technological
reproduction. The reason is twofold. First, technological reproduction
is more independent of the original than is manual reproduction. (...) Second,
technological reproduction can place the copy of the original in situations
which the original itself cannot attain.
(The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Volume 3, p. 103)
To an ever-increasing degree, the work reproduced becomes the reproduction
of a work designed for reproducibility. From a photographic plate, for
example, one can make any number of prints; to ask for the "authentic" print
makes no sense. But as soon as the criterion of authenticity ceases to
be applied to artistic production, the whole social function of art is
revolutionized. Instead of being founded on ritual, it is based on a
different practice: politics
(The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Volume 3, p. 106)
The Greeks had only two ways of technologically reproducing works of art:
casting and stamping. Bronzes, terra cottas, and coins were the only artworks
they could reproduce in large numbers. All others were unique and could not
be technologically reproduced. That is why they had to be made for all
eternity. The state of their technology compelled the Greeks to
produce eternal values in their art. To this they owe their
preeminent position in art history —the standard for subsequent
generations. Undoubtedly, our position lies at the opposite pole from
that of the Greeks. Never before have artworks been technologically
reproducible to such a degree and in such quantities as today.
(The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Volume 3, p. 109)
The masses are a matrix from which all customary behavior toward works
of art is today emerging newborn. Quantity has been transformed into
quality: the greatly increased mass of participants has produced a
different kind of participation. The fact that this new mode of
participation first appeared in a disreputable form should not mislead the
observer. The masses are criticized for seeking distraction
[Zerstreuung] in the work of art, whereas the art lover supposedly
approaches it with concentration. In the case of the masses, the artwork
is seen as a means of entertainment; in the case of the art lover, it is
considered an object of devotion. —This calls for a closer
examination. Distraction and concentration form an antithesis, which may
be formulated as follows. A person who concentrates before a work of art
is absorbed by it; he enters into the work, just as, according to legend,
a Chinese painter entered his completed painting while beholding it. By
contrast, the distracted masses absorb the work of art into themselves.
Their waves lap around it; they encompass it with their tide.
(The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Volume 3, p. 119)
Write about the Frankfurt School and its concept of rationality. Contrast
it to Postmodernism and today's leftist conundrum.
Entertainment factor: 5/10
Intellectual factor: 7/10